先看看示例
作者提供的示例，实际效果取决于你的输入和使用工具。
输入
为含Web应用、API网关与数据库的系统生成STRIDE威胁清单与缓解措施。
输出
预期交付：分类威胁表、风险优先级、缓解建议与威胁模型报告。（编辑说明，非实际运行结果）
方法说明
--- name: stride-analysis-patterns description: "Apply STRIDE methodology to systematically identify threats. Use when analyzing system security, conducting threat modeling sessions, or creating security documentation." risk: safe source: community date_added: "2026-02-27" --- # STRIDE Analysis Patterns Systematic threat identification using the STRIDE methodology. ## Use this skill when - Starting new threat modeling sessions - Analyzing existing system architecture - Reviewing security design decisions - Creating threat documentation - Training teams on threat identification - Compliance and audit preparation ## Do not use this skill when - The task is unrelated to stride analysis patterns - You need a different domain or tool outside this scope ## Instructions - Clarify goals, constraints, and required inputs. - Apply relevant best practices and validate outcomes. - Provide actionable steps and verification. - If detailed examples are required, open `resources/implementation-playbook.md`. ## Resources - `resources/implementation-playbook.md` for detailed patterns and examples. ## Limitations - Use this skill only when the task clearly matches the scope described above. - Do not treat the output as a substitute for environment-specific validation, testing, or expert review. - Stop and ask for clarification if required inputs, permissions, safety boundaries, or success criteria are missing. ## Modeling and scoring limits The Python helpers produce prompts from user-supplied model data; they do not inspect software or establish actual vulnerabilities, control effectiveness or compliance. Impact×likelihood and all severities/deadlines in examples are illustrative ordinal policy choices, not CVSS or calibrated probabilities. Record evidence, assumptions, assets, trust boundaries, owners and residual-risk acceptance for each candidate. Equal numeric trust levels can still cross tenant/identity/administrative boundaries; model explicit boundary membership rather than relying solely on inequality. Encryption does not prevent authorized-but-abusive access, and authentication lockouts can create denial-of-service risks. Missing elements or unmodeled interaction types must be surfaced, not silently treated as no threats. Templates are partial independent blocks; validate imports, duplicate IDs and structured model inputs before use. Keep secret-bearing diagrams/logs private and do not run attack simulations without separate authorization.